Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences E/CN.4/2006/61/Add.3
para 74 (e)
Full recommendation:
To prioritise the elimination of violence against women as a public policy issue and to prevent,
investigate and punish all acts of violence against women, whether perpetrated by private or State actors,
it is recommended that the Government:
Ensure that all institutions and individuals engaged in law enforcement activities are accountable to the
Government and that they respect all human rights and fundamental freedoms as laid out in international
human rights instruments;

Assessment using Impact Iran human rights indicators1
According to the Executive Regulations of Law Enforcement Officers, which is the main executive
regulation in this field, no organisation or institution operates arbitrarily and everyone benefits from the
same set of rules and regulatory structure, in practice.2 Articles 5 and 6 of this regulation3, which is
dedicated to the training of officers, also include "training in behavioral skills such as respect for the
rights of citizens and human dignity", but due to lack of access to the details of these trainings, it cannot
be said that these possible trainings are done within the framework of international human rights
standards or not.
However, some of the above-mentioned bodies are under the control of the executive branch (such as the
Ministry of Intelligence and Security), and others are under the control of other institutions under the
leadership of the Supreme Leader, or his direct appointees (such as the IRGC Intelligence Service,
Judiciary Intelligence Protection, Police Intelligence, or Basij force).
On paper, all of these institutions are accountable to the government, but the problem of nonaccountability in the field of law enforcement officers arises when these bodies each act independently
and each enforces the law according to their own perceptions. This kind of decentralised model of
operations allows for space for these institutions to undertake arbitrary actions, especially in political and
security cases.
For example, the IRGC’s approach to political and national security cases can result in the defendants
being charged with espionage, while this might not be true if the case is presented to another institution,
such as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. In this context, in recent years, a case where a number
of environmental activists have been detained under such charges and have spent the last few years in the
courts, is illustrative of this kind of arbitrary interpretations of the law.4 The Ministry of Intelligence and

CCPR.2.1.S.1; CCPR.2.1.S.3; CCPR.9.1.S.1; CCPR.9.3.S.2; CCPR.2.1.P.1; CCPR.2.3.P.1; CCPR.2.3.P.2; CCPR.9.1.P.1;
CCPR.2.2.O.1; CCPR.2.2.O.3; CCPR.2.3.O.3; CCPR.9.3.O.1
The Executive Regulations of Law Enforcement Officers: http://rrk.ir/Laws/ShowLaw.aspx?Code=18239
The Executive Regulations of Law Enforcement Officers: http://rrk.ir/Laws/ShowLaw.aspx?Code=18239
See these reports: https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-sentences-eight-environmental-activists-for-allegedly-spying-for-u-s/30441439.html and https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/feb/28/environment-safe-space-activism-iran-hardline-


Select target paragraph3